Cause, Nature, and the Limits of Language: Martineau and Maurice on the Philosophical Necessity of Theism

James Martineau and Frederick Maurice sought to show that naturalism was philosophically incoherent by showing the inadequacy of its fundamental terms, such as ‘force’, ‘cause’, and ‘nature’. Maurice argued that historical and contemporary uses of ‘nature’ rested on assumptions that required an agency beyond nature. Martineau claimed that the phenomena that suggested ‘cause’ to observers ultimately rested on that which is beyond the senses. Both claimed that the study of nature alone is insufficient to an understanding of the basic language of scientific investigation, and that there must be a realm beyond the physical. These papers show the importance to theists of Kantian categories and an idealist approach to nature. While Maurice and Martineau used epistemological arguments against naturalistic metaphysics, they did not claim that there were additional intuitions that granted access to truths beyond nature.