Why does the United States give foreign aid?

Abstract

This thesis examined many controversies surrounding the distribution of U.S.
foreign aid, most precisely the factors explaining the allocation of U.S. foreign aid, the
congressional foreign policy behavior related to foreign aid decisions, and the impact of
foreign lobbying. The findings suggest that the United States' security interests appear to
be the central basis on which the United States distributes its Gross Bilateral Official
Development Assistance (ODA). Meanwhile, the congressional foreign policy behavior
reveals that even though the Democrats are more likely to sponsor most foreign aid bills
the Democratic Party's control in Congress does not guarantee that all or at least the
majority of foreign aid bills introduced in Congress will be enacted or the United States'
ODA will increase. The congressional foreign policy behavior suggests also that the
ideologies of the chairmen of the Senate and the House Committees on Appropriations do
not seem to influence the ODA the United States allocates every year. Also, a
complementary case study reveals that that foreign aid legislation follows an unorthodox
lawmaking processes. Furthermore, a case study investigating the actions Egypt takes to
obtain U.S. development assistance shows that in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Egypt used U.S.
domestic lobbyists to advance Egypt's national interest in the United States.

Date of Award	2011
Original language	American English
Awarding Institution	Eastern Illinois University
Supervisor	Ryan C. Hendrickson (Supervisor)